The FAAC Windfall or Subnational Bankruptcy?, By Kayode Oladipupo
…Why Nigeria’s States Cannot Afford a Return to Petrol Subsidy
Nigeria may have removed the petrol subsidy, but it has not yet escaped the subsidy mentality. Whenever the pain of economic reforms becomes politically difficult, the temptation to restore artificially cheap petrol resurfaces. Yet beneath every subsidised litre lies a fundamental question that is often overlooked: who ultimately pays the bill?
The answer is not Abuja alone. It is also the states and local governments whose revenues are shared through the Federation Account. The petrol subsidy debate, therefore, should not be framed simply around what motorists pay at the pump. At its core, it is a debate about whether Nigeria is prepared to preserve the fragile fiscal space now available to its subnational governments—or return to a system that consumes public revenue before it can be deployed for development.
The stakes are enormous.
If a petrol subsidy costing approximately ₦10.95 trillion annually were restored, a substantial portion of the revenue available for distribution through the Federation Account could disappear before reaching the three tiers of government. At a time when many states remain heavily dependent on federal transfers, such a reversal could quickly translate into weaker budgets, delayed salaries, reduced capital expenditure and cuts to social programmes.
Nigeria has been down this road before.
By 2022, the petrol subsidy had become a major drain on public finances. The World Bank noted that the Federation Account received no NNPC revenue during the first four months of that year, as subsidy deductions absorbed resources that could otherwise have supported essential public investment. The consequence was much bigger than an expensive fuel regime. It became a fiscal squeeze across the federation.
The Fiscal Opportunity After Subsidy
The post-subsidy period has created a different opportunity. State and FCT internally generated revenue rose to ₦5.15 trillion in 2025, representing a 40.93 per cent increase over 2024. Enugu alone recorded ₦406.77 billion, more than twice its 2024 IGR. FAAC inflows have also increased significantly. States received about ₦7.32 trillion in direct FAAC allocations in 2025, rising to approximately ₦8.93 trillion when derivation is included.
But this presents a paradox
Higher FAAC receipts have provided states with greater fiscal breathing room without necessarily making them financially independent. Recent analysis suggests that FAAC still accounted for more than 70 per cent of aggregate state revenue in 2025. That level of dependence makes states particularly exposed to any attempt to revive the subsidy regime.
Enugu: What Greater Fiscal Capacity Can Deliver
Enugu illustrates what can become possible when stronger revenue mobilisation is matched by development ambition. The state’s IGR increased from ₦180.50 billion in 2024 to ₦406.77 billion in 2025. Such an expansion provides greater capacity to invest in education, infrastructure, water supply, urban renewal, enterprise development and other sectors capable of improving productivity.
The real question, therefore, is not simply how much additional money a state receives. It is what that money enables the state to build.
A return to petrol subsidy would shrink that fiscal space. Every naira redirected towards subsidising consumption is a naira that cannot be deployed towards infrastructure, human capital development and productive investment.
Taraba: The Vulnerability of Fiscal Dependence
Taraba presents the other side of the equation. With a narrower internally generated revenue base and a predominantly agrarian economy, the state relies substantially on federal transfers to finance government operations and development programmes.
For a state in this position, a reduction in FAAC receipts is not an abstract macroeconomic issue. It can directly affect the ability to pay salaries, maintain schools, support farmers, provide healthcare and finance basic infrastructure.
The irony is striking: a subsidy intended to shield Nigerians from rising living costs could ultimately weaken the capacity of states to provide the very services that protect citizens from poverty and economic vulnerability.
Refining Is Not the Same as Cheap Oil
The emergence of the Dangote Refinery has altered the economics of the petrol debate, but it should not create another illusion. Domestic refining can reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported petroleum products while cutting import logistics and foreign-exchange costs. It cannot, however, permanently insulate the country from global crude prices and international energy-market dynamics.
The policy implication is clear: Nigeria should not replace an import subsidy with an unsustainable price-control regime that undermines domestic refining and discourages investment.
The country needs viable refineries, competitive markets and predictable investment conditions—not another cycle of artificial prices, supply distortions and fiscal distress.
Subsidise the Transition, Not Consumption
Nigeria does not have to choose between abandoning vulnerable citizens and restoring the petrol subsidy. There is a smarter third option: subsidise the transition rather than consumption.
First, the country should accelerate CNG massification. The Federal Government and state governments must move beyond pilot programmes towards a comprehensive transport-energy transition. Commercial transport operators should have access to affordable conversion financing, while CNG infrastructure should be rapidly expanded along major transport corridors.
Second, state electricity reform should be treated as an economic strategy. States should exploit the opportunities created by the Electricity Act to develop embedded generation, mini-grids and independent power solutions. The objective should be to move businesses away from expensive petrol and diesel generators towards reliable and locally generated electricity.
Third, transport assistance should be targeted. Rather than subsidising every litre consumed by every motorist, government should subsidise mobility through digital transport vouchers, affordable mass transit and CNG- or electric-powered public transportation. Such interventions would provide more direct relief to workers, students and vulnerable households.
Fourth, subsidy proposals should face a fiscal-discipline test. Any proposal to restore or expand petrol subsidies should publicly demonstrate its implications for FAAC revenues, state finances, capital expenditure, debt sustainability and social-sector spending.
That principle should become part of Nigeria’s fiscal governance: no subsidy policy should be approved without accounting transparently for its cost to all three tiers of government.
Nigeria’s Choice Is Bigger Than Petrol
Nigeria’s reform challenge is ultimately bigger than petrol. It is about whether the country will continue financing consumption at the expense of production, or deliberately deploy scarce public resources towards building an economy capable of generating income, jobs and affordable services without perpetual government intervention.
The choice should not be between expensive petrol and cheap petrol.
It should be between a consumption-dependent Nigeria and a productive Nigeria.
Restoring the petrol subsidy may provide immediate political relief. But if it drains the Federation Account, weakens state finances and crowds out investment, Nigerians could end up paying for cheap petrol with expensive poverty.
The Federal Government should therefore resist a wholesale return to petrol subsidy. Instead, it should work with the states to establish a National Transition Compact focused on protecting vulnerable households, accelerating cheaper energy alternatives, strengthening state revenue mobilisation, expanding public transportation and ring-fencing a greater share of additional FAAC resources for productive investment.
Nigeria cannot afford to burn its development capital merely to make consumption temporarily cheaper.The next phase of reform must make Nigerians less dependent on petrol—not make government more dependent on subsidising it.
Oladipupo is a Public Policy Advocate and Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of Kemkay Consult. He writes from Akure, Ondo State, Nigeria.




